4 December 1981

State Dept. review completed


NSA review completed

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	Deputy Director of Central Inte	11iderice Williamic 1	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director, Intelligence Communit		
FROM:			
	Director, Office of Community C	Coordination	
SUBJECT:	SSCI Hearing: 10 December 1981		
1. Attache	ed is a set of questions provided	i by Dan Childs. It	;
it is not has not yet disc to give you time	greatly changed from the notes I ussed them with Senator Wallop be to think about possible respons to once he's discussed them with	out is providing them to us ses. He said they are	
2. I_advis	ed Dan that questions on the FY He said he understood and offere	1983 budget were	
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program managers	already aware that you would no . (He was the staffer I referre sked for.) He did not comment o	ed to in my earlier memo	
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
NRO review(s) completed.

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# COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

## General

- 1. The collection activities of the intelligence community are driven by a complex system of policymakers' needs, requirements and priorities.
  - A. How and by whom are policymakers' needs translated and incorporated into the collection process?
  - B. In your view is the current system adequate to insure an integrated and effective collection effort throughout the community?
  - C. What are the principal weaknesses in the present system?
  - D. What specific steps would you suggest to strengthen and improve the present system?
  - 2. In order for the Committee to make rational decisions about future collection needs, it is important for us to understand your views on the major challenges facing intelligence over the longer term, and the adequacy of current capabilities.
    - Mhat are the key policy issues or trends that will most influence the scope and direction of the intelligence collection effort during the next five to ten years?



- B. In your view, what are the major deficiencies in current U.S. collection capabilities?
- C. What major new initiatives do you believe will be required to adequately address the long-term challenges the intelligence community is likely to face?
- D. Do current administration budget forecasts provide adequate flexibility to fund these initiatives?
- 3. Evidence suggests that competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is likely to grow in the years ahead.
  - A. In your view, what are the key long-term intelligence problems facing the community with respect to confidently assessing the Soviet threat?
  - B. In which of these areas does there currently exist a moderate to high degree of uncertainty in our assessment of the nature or extent of the threat?
  - C. What specific actions have been taken or are planned to improve our collection capabilities in these areas?
- 4. For the most part, intelligence collection capabilities have been designed to operate in a relatively benign environment.
  - A. Under current planning, against what level of conflict are U.S. intelligence collection assets expected to survive attack?



- B. What specific steps have been taken or are planned to improve the survivability of collection assets in the event of attack?
- C. What contingency plans exist for transferring control of national collection assets to the Department of Defense in the event of war? How frequently are these plans exercised?
- D. What contingency plans have been developed for integrating civilian intelligence personnel into the military in wartime?

- C. Is there any evidence of Soviet attempts to influence our collection efforts either through misinformation or electronic means that we have uncovered?
- D. What measures could the Soviets take if they were determined to deceive or disrupt our collection efforts?

  What counter-measures could be employed to guard 25X1 against such actions?

## TOP SECRET

6.	Recent crises have demonstrated a lack of robustness i	n our
techi	nical collection systems to be able to respond to multi	.ple
cris	es and continue to maintain coverage of other high pric	rity
targ	ets.	,

25X1 NRO

A.	•
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B. What specific actions are planned in FY 1983 and beyond to improve our flexibility?

#### Space Systems

- 7. Space-based reconnaissance is critical to a broad range of key foreign policy concerns.
  - A. What is your assessment of how well the space-based reconnaissance program is able to fulfill its present and planned collection responsibilities?
  - B. What are the major weaknesses in the U.S. reconnaissance program?
  - C. What specific actions are planned in FY 1983 and beyond to overcome these weaknesses?
  - D. Who is responsible for assessing space-based reconnaissance needs in wartime? To what extent have such assessments been undertaken? With what results? 25X1

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E. What steps have been taken or are planned to improve the survivability of space-based reconnaissance systems in the event of attack?

8.	The	Cor	mitte	ee ha	as exp	ressed	cond	ern	on	а	number	of	occasions	25X1
duri	ing	the	past	two	years	about	the	lack	of	r	obustn	ess		
			in	SDAC	re-bas	ed reco	nnnsi	ecar	000	C 77	ctome			

- A. In your view, does the currently planned procurement and launch strategies for the major systems provide sufficient protection against potential gaps or unacceptable degradation in coverage over the long-term?
- 9. It is our understanding that the Administration is currently re-examining U.S. space policy.
  - A. What is the status of this effort?

25X1

- B. What conclusions, if any, have been reached thus far regarding future U.S. space policy?
- 10. The Committee continues to be concerned about current plans for transitioning U.S. reconnaissance systems to the space shuttle.
  - A. How confident are you that the shuttle will meet its projected milestones and long-term performance goals?
  - B. Under current planning, what would be the impact on the space-based reconnaissance mission in the event these milestones and performance goals are not achieved?


- C. What specific actions have been taken or are planned to minimize the potential impact?
- D. Are you satisfied that current planning provides a sufficient hedge against unforeseen shuttle problems to prevent unacceptable gaps or degradation in mission coverage?
- E. What impact has the fourteen month delay at the Vandenburg facility had on shuttle transition planning?
- F. Will shuttle performance enhancements be required to meet national reconnaissance needs? If so, what actions have been taken to insure such enhancements are available when needed?
- G. Should the current re-examination of U.S. space policy conclude that it is in the national interest to maintain an expendable launch capability for an extended period, what impact would this have on shuttle transition planning? How would it alter current planning for expendable launch capabilities?
- H. In your view, should the U.S. depend solely on the shuttle as the only means of launching space missions in the future?

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## Human Source

- 13. Human source collection is an important part of the overall U.S. intelligence effort.
  - A. In your view, do we have sufficient clandestine human source collection assets abroad to adequately cover the broad range of issues likely to be of concern to policymakers in the future?
  - B. What are the major gaps or deficiencies in present 25X1 clandestine human source collection? Over the long-term?



- C. What are the principal reasons behind the current and projected deficiencies? What steps can be taken to overcome these deficiencies?
- D. How successful are we in acquiring information through human sources that fill important gaps in our know-ledge as opposed to confirming information or information of little consequence?

E.	What steps have been taken to improve clandest.	
	human source collection in third-world areas	
		<b>.</b>

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With what results?

- F. Is the present structure and deployment of clandestine human source assets sufficient to meet potential wartime needs?
- G. In which countries or geographic areas do we maintain active clandestine stay-behind networks?
- H. What contingency plans exist to insure worldwide clandestine human source collection will continue at an acceptable level in wartime?
- I. What actions have been taken or are planned to expand non-official cover for clandestine collection officers abroad?
- J. What ratio do you hope to achieve over the long-term between official and non-official cover officers?

25X1



Κ.	How man	y officer:	s are presen	tly under	non-official	
	cover?	How many	are planned	ъу 1985?		25X1
L						

- N. To what extent do self-imposed administrative or operational constraints impede human source collection efforts abroad?
- O. Do case officers assigned abroad have adequate language skills and knowledge of the countries in which they serve? What percentage have at least a 3-3 proficiency
  - in the language of the country in which they are assigned?
- P. Do adequate training facilities exist to train the quantity and quality of case officers that will be needed to meet future clandestine human source collection requirements?
- Q. What are the most significant problems encountered in attracting and retaining high-caliber officers in clandestine human source collection?

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### Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)


- 14. The U.S. SIGINT effort also plays a vital role in our ability to keep abreast of worldwide developments.
  - A. What trends or developments are most likely to influence the scope and direction of the U.S. SIGINT effort?
  - B. What are the major shortcomings in present U.S. SIGINT capabilities? Over the long-term?
  - C. What actions are necessary to overcome these deficiencies?
- 15.. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are employing new and exotic electronics techniques to command their military forces.
  - -A. What is your assessment of the U.S. capability to keep pace with these changes in the signal environment?
  - .B. What are the major gaps or deficiencies in our SIGINT capabilities to collect against these signals?
  - C. What actions would you suggest to improve our capabilities to keep pace with these changes?
  - D. How has the reorganization of the Soviet command and control structure impacted our SIGINT collection capabilities?
  - 16. Much of the U.S. SIGINT collection effort is dependent upon large fixed sites located in foreign countries.

Α.	What specif	ic	steps	would	you	recommend	to	reduce	our
	dependency	on	these	fixed	site	es?			

В.	To what	extent	could	collection	from	these	site	s be	
	shifted	to					le	ss	25X <sup>2</sup>

vulnerable means of collection?

- 17. The community has been criticized from time to time for collecting far more than can be effectively utilized. This is particularly true in the area of SIGINT collection.
  - A. In your view, is this a valid criticism?
  - B. How successful have we been in developing effective means for dealing with the volumn of signals collected?
  - C. Should consideration be given to altering our philosophy and approach to signals collection?
- 18. Developments in the third-world, and global issues are becoming of increasing importance to U.S. interests.
  - A. Is the SIGINT system sufficiently flexible to provide adequate coverage of these targets and maintain coverage of other high priority targets?
  - B. What are the key weaknesses in our ability to adequately cover these targets?
  - C. What actions have been taken or are planned to overcome these weaknesses?



- 19. Modern SIGINT collection activities are heavily dependent upon sophisticated automated data processing systems.
  - A. Do SIGINT processing systems enjoy sufficiently high priority in our planning to insure that we get full advantage from our collection efforts?
  - B. What steps have been taken or are planned to improve the survivability of these systems in the event of attack?

## Other -

- 21. The Defense Intelligence Agency has indicated for the past two years that military data bases for employment of U.S. forces are weefully inadequate.
  - A. What specific collection efforts have been undertaken or are planned to improve the military data bases?
  - B. Do military requirements enjoy a high enough priority to compete in the allocation of national collection resources?

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